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Abstract
Energy efficiency activities driven by White
Certificate Trading schemes (WCT) achieve the
objective of conserving energy, and in most circum-
stances, also that of reducing greenhouse gas
(GHG) emissions. The potential therefore exists that
both objectives could be targeted by a single policy
mechanism. Energy efficiency activities are impor-
tant from a GHG mitigation perspective as they rep-
resent some of the least costly GHG mitigation
activities available to economies. 
However, there are some significant differences
between the use of a direct policy instrument to tar-
get GHG emissions mitigation, and the use of an
indirect instrument such as WCT, whose direct poli-
cy objective is to achieve energy efficiency. Most
importantly, WCT utilises intensity targets, whereas
GHG mitigation is required by science to comprise
absolute reductions. International experience does
however suggest that white certificates can be fully
fungible with a GHG mitigation policy instrument
such as an emissions trading scheme, as long as
double counting rules are firmly in place, and the
design of the schemes are compatible.
Given that 80 percent of the South African GHG
emissions are energy related, with energy efficiency
measures in industry, commerce and the residential
sector representing the bulk of negative cost mitiga-
tion options available in the economy, energy effi-
ciency has an important role to play in the country’s
mitigation strategy.
This paper presents results on research into
WCT as a policy option for South Africa conducted
in 2008 and presented at the Climate Change
Summit 2009.  It investigates in particular the
Electricity Conservation Scheme (ECS) as an
option for incorporating a WCT mechanism.
There is limited experience and therefore analy-
sis on WCS available to date, and even less on the
potential interaction and linkages of WCS and emis-
sions trading schemes. This paper therefore identi-
fies significant scope for future research on this
topic. 
Keywords: energy efficiency, greenhouse gas, White
Certificates, White Certificate Trading schemes
1. White certificate schemes
1.1 What is a white certificate (trading)
scheme?
A white certificate, which is also referred to as an
Energy Saving Certificate (ESC), or an Energy
Efficiency Credit (EEC), is an instrument awarded
by an authorisation body to guarantee that a spe-
cific amount of energy savings has been achieved.
Each certificate is a unique and traceable commod-
ity carrying a property right over a certain amount
of additional energy savings and certifying that the
benefit of these savings has not been accounted for
elsewhere (EuroWhiteCert Project, 2006).
The precise definition of a White Certificate
Scheme (WCS) is not yet clear in either the litera-
ture or in practice. Some authors and practitioners
distinguish a WCS on the basis of trading, whilst
others don’t make trading a pre-requisite. In most
cases, some form of flexibility in achieving targets is
important, but this may not necessarily be through
trading as such. For example, the World Energy
Council (WEC) increased its definition of White
Certificates to include ‘all’ forms of Energy
Efficiency Obligations that are in place even if they
do not work in conjunction with tradable certifi-
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cate’. The defining feature in their definition is that
there should be an improvement in the efficiency
with which end-use customers use energy from
energy companies (Lees, 2007). The full range of
schemes considered in the literature or implement-
ed is considered in this paper, with a focus on those
with a trading element. 
Participants in WCSs are typically suppliers or
distributors of electricity, gas and oil, and are
required to perform energy efficiency measures that
are consistent with a pre-defined percentage of their
annual supply. If these energy producers and / or
suppliers do not meet their mandated targets, they
are required to pay a penalty. White certificates are
awarded to the participant when an amount of
energy is saved, the producer can then use the cer-
tificate for their own compliance purposes or can
sell it to other parties in order to meet their compli-
ance. Technology coverage by the white certificates
varies from scheme to scheme (EuroWhiteCert
Project, 2006).
Key players in WCSs as implemented or
designed to date are the government bodies who
set up the schemes and appoint bodies to control
their operation, retail energy suppliers or distribu-
tors who are obligated to meet targets, and both
energy service companies (ESCOs) that can create
certificates from energy saving projects and housing
corporations that can create certificates from build-
ing renovations (EuroWhiteCert Project, 2006).
WCSs which involve trading are baseline-and-
credit type trading schemes with targets which are
intensity based (per unit of energy consumed) as
opposed to absolute levels of energy consumption.
This characteristic is particularly important when
considering WCSs as a greenhouse mitigation poli-
cy instrument (Capozza, 2006), as emissions reduc-
tion achieved under a WCS are necessarily relative
rather than absolute.
From a greenhouse gas emissions reduction per-
spective, WCSs are an indirect policy instrument, as
their primary objective is energy efficiency.
However, to the extent that the energy saved is gen-
erated from fossil fuels, a significant volume of
greenhouse gas emissions can be achieved. 
1.2 International examples of WCSs
WCSs are not widely used internationally, and there
are very few examples of those incorporating trad-
ing in its pure form. Hybrids abound, and energy
efficiency targets are common. Emissions Trading
Schemes (ETSs) where energy efficiency projects
dominate can also be considered as a type of WCS.
WCSs appear to be most prevalent in Europe, the
US and Australia, with very little information on
WCSs in developing countries (Lees, 2007). Many
WCSs cover the residential sectors (Netherlands,
UK), with examples of industry level WCSs less
common.
In Europe, several countries have implemented,
or are considering implementing energy efficiency
obligations (for example, Belgium, Denmark,
France, Ireland, Italy and the United Kingdom),
some of which have scope for certificate trading.
The obligated entities in these countries are energy
suppliers or distributors ranging from only electrici-
ty to all energy including the end-use sectors to
which these obligations apply. In most cases, the
targets are set by the government (Lees, 2007).
These energy efficiency schemes have proved to be
very flexible and have worked in both monopoly
energy utilities and in liberalised energy markets
(Lees, 2007). Trading within the scheme currently
exists only in France, Italy and the UK. Compliance
has been achieved in European schemes by almost
all participants, without resorting to penalties.
Italy started a WCS in January 2005, including
all energy end-use sectors, as well as intermediate
users in the gas sector. Targets are set for distributors
of electricity and gas. Targets can be met through
either a reduction in electricity consumption, a
reduction in natural gas consumption or a reduction
in the consumption of fossil fuels, resulting in three
types of white certificates that can be created by the
scheme. Fifty percent of the target allocated needs
to be achieved through either electricity or gas sav-
ing, the remaining amount may be achieved
through the reduction in fossil fuels (Oikonomou,
2004; EuroWhiteCert Project, 2006). Design,
implementation and compliance is carried out by
the Authority for Electricity and Gas.
Although the UK has no white certificate as
such, it has implemented two schemes dealing with
energy efficiency in the household sector. The first
was the Energy Efficient Commitment (EEC)
scheme which ran from 2005 to 2008. The aim of
the scheme was to stimulate energy efficiency with-
in the household sector in the UK, where over 50
percent of national energy savings are to be
realised. The EEC did not provide tradable certifi-
cates as such but did allow trading of energy savings
as well as trading of individual obligations which
was facilitated through OFGEM (Oikonomou,
2004). 
The EEC has been superseded by the Carbon
Emissions Reduction Target (CERT) which runs
from 2008 – 2011 and aims to reduce 154 million
tonnes of CO2 by 31 March 2011. CERT is a
mandatory scheme and is supported by The
Electricity and Gas Order of 2008. The overall tar-
get within CERT is apportioned by the UK energy
regulator, the Office of Gas and Electricity Markets
(OFGEM) to gas and electricity suppliers that have
a minimum of 50 000 customers. Each supplier’s
individual target is known as its carbon obligation.
Suppliers meet their carbon obligations through
various energy efficiency activities e.g. subsidising
cavity wall insulation or delivering free compact flu-
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orescent lamps (CFLs) to low-income households.
Many of these activities are subcontracted out.
Trading is allowed between obligated parties and
there is intertemporal flexibility in that trades can
take place over different obligation periods (Lees,
2007). OFGEM assesses activities to ensure energy
savings and therefore carbon emission reductions
are taking place. Under CERT a minimum of 40%
of the overall target needs to be focussed at low-
income households or the elderly (OFGEM, Carbon
Emission Reduction Target). The UK government is
investigating introducing white certificate trading
after 2001 for non-obligated parties (Lees, 2007).
In the US, Connecticut, Pennsylvania, and
Nevada have Energy Efficiency Portfolio Standards
that require regulated utilities to meet a target of
their project power needs through energy efficiency.
Utilities must meet their obligations by either reduc-
ing their consumer’s energy usage, or by purchasing
white certificates. 
A WCS can be understood to be in place in New
South Wales in Australia, as a component of the
Greenhouse Gas Abatement Scheme (GGAS).
Certificates for use in the GGAS can be generated
through energy efficiency projects, which are often
undertaken by energy management firms. This out-
sourcing represents the ability of the energy savings
to be undertaken by different entities to those which
are regulated under the GGAS.
1.3 White certificate scheme designs 
WCS vary considerably in their design and defini-
tion. Where trading is a component of a WCS,
many of the design considerations for an emissions
trading scheme or green certificate trading scheme
will apply. Descriptions of the common design fea-
tures of white certificate schemes follow.
1.3.1 Targets
Targets can be mandatory or voluntary, and are
expressed as a reduction in energy use from a spe-
cific baseline. Both the target setting and sectors
involved are usually decided by the government as
opposed to the energy regulator of the country. This
is advantageous as energy efficiency obligations are
part and parcel of the environmental concerns of a
country and have implications on social aspects of
the nation. These targets are often set according to
volume of electricity supplied or distributed (in the
residential sector this is often calculated through
customer numbers serviced, and not actual volume
of electricity) (Lees, 2007). Additional policy objec-
tives can be incorporated through target-setting, for
example, in the UK and Belgium obligated compa-
nies are required to ensure that a proportion of their
targets are met in low income households (Lees,
2007). An understanding of what is required to
achieve targets, the cost of energy savings, is impor-
tant to ensure that the scheme is effective, but also
that the costs of the scheme is not punitive on ener-
gy consumers. 
1.3.2 Point of regulation or obligation
There are a number of potential points of regula-
tion, or obligation in a WCS, including energy sup-
pliers, distributors, producers with direct contracts
with customers, or large electricity consumers
(Capozza, 2006). Electricity suppliers are identified
as being good candidates for regulation
(Oikonomou, 2004) as they have the resources and
market power to support the transition to cleaner
and less emissions- intensive energy services, and
with careful policy design can be incentivised to
shift from an energy sale focus, to that of selling
energy services. Suppliers can also use existing
infrastructure, technological know-how and client
relations to implement energy efficiency projects
quickly and effectively (Oikonomou, 2004). The
limited number of suppliers in an energy system
reduces administrative and compliance costs.
Different to an emissions trading scheme, the
point of regulation in a WCS is typically not where
the energy-saving activity occurs. For reasons of
ease of monitoring, compliance and administration,
regulation tends to lie with the energy suppliers or
distributors, whereas the savings occur with the end
consumers. Intermediaries in the form of ESCOs
whose core business is to identify and implement
energy savings may perform this role, stimulating
the development of the energy service industry
In practice, a WCS will always involve electricity
as an energy carrier. Natural gas is very often
included (France, Great Britain, Italy), and in
France domestic fuel for cooling and heating is also
a component (Capozza, 2006). The energy carrier
involved will be determined by the energy policy
objectives of each country. There are no examples
of transport being included in a WCS (Capozza,
2006).
1.3.3 Eligible technologies 
Energy-efficiency technologies can be prescribed in
the design of the WCS. This is not considered opti-
mal, as it can encourage lock-in to levels of techno-
logical development, only enabling access to static
efficiencies (Oikonomou and Patel, 2004).
Flexibility in technology choice is an important
component of an economic instrument in achieving
dynamic and ongoing cost efficiencies. That the
scheme targets are set at an appropriately stringent
level is an important component in incentivising
technological innovation. Support for specific tech-
nologies through additional policy measures such
as subsidies may assist government in pursuing
additional energy efficiency objectives, but may
simultaneously introduce inefficient distortions into
the market. 
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1.3.4 Monitoring and verification
Issues pertaining to monitoring and verification are
of particular importance for the cost-effectiveness of
implementation and verification of energy efficien-
cy schemes. Actual measurements or deemed or
engineering estimates of energy savings can be
used to monitor the performance of a scheme.
Deemed, or ex ante, measures have been used in
the residential sector where an average energy-sav-
ing figure is used for each household even though
the actual energy saving will vary from household
to household. The large numbers of households
involved will ensure accuracy. In the UK, this fea-
ture has led to monitoring costs being less than one
percent of the cost of energy supplier expenditure
(Lees, 2007). In the commercial and industrial sec-
tors however, actual measurements are required
given the scale of savings involved. An alternative is
to use engineering estimates or scaling of known
energy savings according to the size of the opera-
tion to provide a simple and yet robust alternative
(Lees, 2007).
Ex ante monitoring procedures are strongly
favoured by WCSs currently implemented
(Capozza, 2006), as they significantly reduce
administrative and compliance costs. Ex ante meth-
ods seem to be well accepted by stakeholders, and
can be easily updated with baseline changes. Given
that conservancy is an important criteria for the
development of ex ante procedures, a comparison
with ex post (actual) measures show that often
emissions savings are underestimated. However,
confirming the additionality of projects is easier
under an ex post system (Capozza, 2006).
1.3.5 Trading
Given that there is little length of experience in trad-
ing WCSs, lessons are few. In European schemes
where energy suppliers have energy efficiency obli-
gations, which are realised through their customer’s
reduction activities, a question has arisen around
whether competitive market forces amongst the
suppliers would not achieve the objective of trading
in a less complicated manner (i.e., competition for
energy service delivery to customers) (Capozza,
2006). However, the flexibility of a market in ener-
gy efficiency credits is still held to realise efficiency
gains which would not be available in the absence
of trading (Capozza, 2006).
1.3.6 Banking
Most schemes allow for the transference of energy
savings from one target period to the next, through
the banking of certificates. This has positive benefits
for both the obligated company and energy effi-
ciency industries as it allows flexibility and phased
investment decision making. When banking was
not allowed in the UK in 2000, targets were met
early and whilst waiting for a new period to start
there was a marked drop in activity which had neg-
ative implications for the insulation industry at the
time (Lees, 2007).
1.3.7 Additionality and baselines
Ensuring that energy efficiency activities are addi-
tional (in addition to those that would have
occurred in the absence of the WCS) is critical to
ensuring scheme performance. This is more difficult
in an environment where there are numerous inter-
acting energy policy instruments to be accounted
for. Baselines are related to additionality concerns,
and setting the correct baseline will directly deter-
mine scheme performance. Overly cumbersome
additionality and baseline rules will deter participa-
tion in the scheme, and the incentive to over-
achieve targets (Capozza, 2006).
1.4 Lessons from international experience 
WCSs theoretically guarantee that a certain volume
of energy savings is achieved. Thus, the policy ben-
efit is known upfront, but not the cost of achieving
these savings, which is determined by the market if
trading is allowed for. The upfront uncertainty
around compliance costs can deter investment in
energy efficiency initially (Capozz, 2006). The intro-
duction of a price mechanism, through trading,
allows for the least cost achievement of targets.
There has been little experience of trading white
certificates to date, but most policymakers believe
that incorporating trading in the future will enhance
the performance of schemes (Lees, 2007; Capozza,
2006).
Depending on the mechanism through which
targets are allocated to sectors and participants,
trading schemes need not have any burden on pub-
lic budgets. European evidence suggests that the
costs to government lie in the region of 1-2 percent
of energy bills (Lees, 2007). Depending on the size
threshold to entrants, together with other design
considerations, transaction costs can be substantial,
and WCSs may require costly harmonisation with
other energy policies (EuroWhiteCert Project,
2006).
WCSs can stimulate a market for energy servic-
es, and the growth of the ESCO sector as demon-
strated by the New South Wales GGAS scheme
(Capozza, 2006). A major benefit of WCS has been
found to be the systematic measurement, tracking
and accounting of energy efficiency activities. This
is an important aspect to both greenhouse gas and
energy efficiency policy objectives (Oikonomou,
2004). European experience has shown that a WCS
can be successfully implemented in both monopo-
listic and liberalised energy markets, and that it can
develop with the energy sector as it transitions from
one to the other (Lees, 2007).
Certain criteria have been observed as being
important for the success of a WCS (Lees, 2007). It
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is important that the point of regulation is very
clearly defined in the energy supply chain.
Additionality must be addressed, particularly where
there are large numbers of emission reduction activ-
ities. Regulatory certainty is highly advantageous,
stimulating the market and investment decisions. 
Interaction with other policy mechanisms in the
energy sector requires further investigation, but
there are grounds for double counting and addi-
tionality concerns, together with ensuring that con-
sumers do not bear the costs of the schemes if com-
pliance costs are passed through (Lees, 2007,
Capozza, 2006, Oikonomou, 2004). The Italian,
French and UK schemes do not overlap with other
policy instruments, whilst the New South Wales
Scheme is embedded in the GGAS, a greenhouse
gas emissions cap-and-trade scheme (Capozza,
2006). Design of the interlinking schemes is deter-
minant of the outcome.
Experience is inconclusive around the ability of
WCS to stimulate the introduction of new technolo-
gies. The UK EES did not see many new technolo-
gies being introduced (Lees, 2007), whereas the
experience of France indicates that a WCS speeds
up the diffusion of efficient technologies, through
the stimulation of a market in operators who direct-
ly engage with efficient equipment dealers
(Capozza, 2006). On balance, the performance of
WCS compared to other policy instruments for
incentivising energy efficiency within an energy sys-
tem has not yet been sufficiently studied (Capozza,
2006).
1.5 White certificate trading and interaction
with greenhouse gas mitigation policy
instruments 
Energy efficiency activities achieve both the objec-
tive of conserving energy, and in most circum-
stances, reducing GHG emissions. There is there-
fore the potential that these activities can be target-
ed by both types of policy mechanisms. Energy effi-
ciency activities also represent some of the least
costly greenhouse gas mitigation activities available
to economies. Given the importance of appropriate
greenhouse gas mitigation scheme design within the
context of long-term policy certainty and the con-
straints of short-term gaps in information, WCSs
may offer attractive interim greenhouse gas mitiga-
tion instruments, which could evolve or be
superceded by alternative policy options.
When considering interaction or integration
between WCSs and a greenhouse gas mitigation
policy instrument, it is important to note that emis-
sions reductions under a WCS are by their nature
relative, whereas many greenhouse gas mitigation
policy instruments, such as cap-and-trade schemes,
involve absolute targets. Interlinkages between the
two will have to specifically account for this differ-
ence in order to avoid leakage of emissions reduc-
tions from the absolute sector. The interaction
between the UK Climate Change Agreement partic-
ipants and the direct participants in the UK
Emissions Trading Scheme demonstrates a complex
mechanism for coping with relative versus absolute
reductions, it is possible to achieve but increases the
administrative complexity of the policy environ-
ment.
Additionality is also a concern when considering
the interaction of WCS with other energy and emis-
sions mitigation policy instruments. Should energy
efficiency activities be required under separate
schemes and regulations, their crediting under a
WCS will not result in additional energy savings.
Double counting may also present a problem if the
same activities are claimed under different schemes
(for example, an emissions trading scheme and a
WCS). Co-ordination of the registration of activities
under the different schemes is therefore important. 
Another consideration for the interaction
between WCS and direct greenhouse gas mitigation
policy options is that because of the prevalence of
negative cost mitigation options in the energy effi-
ciency realm, WCS may favour actions which are
easy to implement and measure. This is both an
advantage and disadvantage of these schemes.
International experience suggests that white cer-
tificates can be fully fungible with an emissions trad-
ing scheme, as long as double counting rules are
firmly in place (GGAS), and the design of the
schemes are compatible. For example, interaction
between the EU Emissions Trading Scheme and a
possible WCS is limited by the fact that the obliga-
tions introduced by the two directives concern dif-
ferent actors within the energy sector (power pro-
ducers and energy-intensive industries vs. energy
distributors (EuroWhiteCert Project, 2006).
2. WCS as a greenhouse gas mitigation
policy option for South Africa
2.1 Relevant characteristics of the South
African energy sector
Energy emissions constitute 80 percent of the South
African greenhouse gas emissions inventory (RSA
2005; Van der Merwe & Scholes 1998), with ener-
gy efficiency measures in industry, commerce and
the residential sector representing the bulk of nega-
tive cost mitigation options available in the econo-
my. Therefore, energy efficiency clearly plays an
important role in the country’s mitigation strategy
for the short-to-medium term at least.
The importance of energy efficiency as a green-
house gas mitigation instrument is further prioritised
by the current energy crisis in the country. Energy
efficiency is a mainstay of the country’s response to
the crisis, under the policy objectives of energy
security and safeguarding economic growth. 
The primary energy carriers in the South African
energy sector are electricity, coal, liquid fuels and
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natural gas, with coal providing the overwhelming
majority of the country’s energy requirements, rep-
resenting the primary fuel for electricity generation
and feedstock for Sasol’s coal-to-liquids refinery.
Eskom, the national utility, generates and transmits
the overwhelming majority of electricity within the
country, under a monopolistic market structure. The
government embarked on an electricity sector liber-
alisation path in the late 1990s, but this has been
substantively abandoned due to the current supply
crisis. Elements remain, however, with 30 percent of
generation required to come from independent
power producers in the future although Eskom will
remain the sole purchaser of electricity coming onto
the grid. 
South Africa has developed a traditional com-
petitive advantage in the area of energy-intensive
industry, particularly mining, due to its historically
cheap electricity supply. Low-cost electricity has
also resulted in inefficiencies. Therefore, there are
real competitive issues faced by industry, particular-
ly export oriented sectors, as they will need to adjust
to an environment of higher electricity tariffs going
forward. To date, Eskom has run a Demand Side
Management Programme which has subsidised the
capital costs of energy efficiency and DSM projects
out of a levy on electricity tariffs. There is therefore
some experience within the country on monitoring
and evaluating demand savings, although this pro-
gramme has not stimulated the ESCO sector as
anticipated. 
An Energy Efficiency Accord is in place between
business and government in support of the govern-
ment’s 12 percent energy efficiency target for 2015.
The accord is voluntary, and has 44 signatories to
date (NBI, 2009). 
As with many developing countries, South
Africa faces the distributional challenge of making
energy accessible and affordable to the poor, in the
face of rising energy costs and pressures to consid-
er the environmental costs of emissions intensive
power generation. Poverty alleviation and job cre-
ation are the mainstays of the emerging govern-
ment policy post the change of leadership within
the ANC. 
2.2 Current energy sector policy context 
In response to the energy crisis in the country, the
Power Conservation Programme being developed
by Eskom has a 10 percent national reduction in
electricity consumption as its objective, achieved
through mandatory quotas on large targeted ener-
gy users under the Energy Conservation Scheme,
and through pricing and demand-side management
interventions for its smaller customers (Eskom,
2008c). 
The ECS starts with large consumers using
above 25GWh in both the private and public sec-
tors under a voluntary Initial Phase (Eskom,
2008b), whilst the necessary regulatory environ-
ment is being created for mandatory targets. Targets
are allocated according to the baseline period of
October 2006 to September 2007, chosen due to
there being little load shedding over this time. Work
is underway to consider whether differentiated tar-
gets will be applied to sectors according to their
energy saving potential. The scheme does antici-
pate there to be a trading mechanism, referred to as
the ‘Right to consume’. The mechanisms for this
trading component are currently under develop-
ment. In the second phase, it is anticipated that
users above 100 MWh per year will be included,
which represents around 75 percent of total elec-
tricity consumption (Eskom, 2008c). The penalty
for non-compliance is proposed as a steeply esca-
lating tariff structure once an individual user’s target
is exceeded, with an electricity cut-off for repeat
offenders.
The potential for scheme failure or underperfor-
mance is a critical issue for Eskom, as it will jeopar-
dise the electricity supply system as a whole. The
role of distributors in monitoring and implementing
the ECS is important, and the number and variance
in these (180 in total) presents significant challenges
(Eskom, 2008c). 
The ECS therefore represents a WCS in a fairly
advanced stage of design, and with significant gov-
ernment and industry stakeholder backing. Aspects
of incentives and trading to optimise uptake and
cost efficiency are provisionally included in its
design. The provision for flexibility for those sectors
least able to conserve power gives the potential to
safeguard against competitiveness concerns. 
In its current design and context, the ECS is not
being positioned as a greenhouse gas mitigation
mechanism. Its primary objective is to avoid disrup-
tions to electricity supply. However, from the per-
spective of emissions mitigation, it represents a pro-
gressive policy mechanism which targets low cost
emissions reduction and which is in advanced
stages of development. 
2.3 WCS as a greenhouse gas mitigation
instrument in South Africa 
Given the advanced level of development of the
PCP and ECS in South Africa, the primary inten-
tion of this paper is not to critique the appropriate-
ness of a WCS as an energy efficiency policy mech-
anism for the country, but rather to explore its value
as a greenhouse gas mitigation mechanism.
However, because one of the components of this is
the likelihood of a WCS performing in the South
African context, this is considered in the light of
international experience in WCS. As there is little lit-
erature or international evidence on the topic of
WCS as an emissions mitigation instruments, nor
on their application to developing countries, there-
fore the discussion in the remainder of this paper is
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largely exploratory in nature, posing many ques-
tions for further research. 
2.3.1 Comments based on the application of
theory and international experience to the South
African context
Regulatory policy theory suggests that different pol-
icy objectives should be individually targeted
through separate policy instruments. This would
suggest that targeting greenhouse gas mitigation
through a WCS is likely to be inefficient and could
lead to potential policy distortions. The double-
counting of reductions is also a concern when too
many policy instruments are employed for a similar
objective (BRC, undated).
Given that a WCS achieves relative rather than
absolute emissions reductions, this will always limit
its use as a greenhouse gas mitigation instrument
where an absolute level of greenhouse gas emis-
sions reduction are required, such as South Africa in
the long term. In South Africa in particular, the pri-
mary intention of the ECS is to create space on the
grid to supply new connections until new capacity
can come on line (Eskom, 2008c). The extent to
which energy savings are entrenched and long term
in a WCS is therefore important from an emissions
mitigation perspective particularly in the situation
where the energy utility itself has developed the
WCS. The ability of a WCS to stimulate innovation
and adoption of new technologies is also therefore
relevant. 
Lack of experience with trading, and an energy
sector unfamiliar with how a market operates may
indicate that a WCS including trading is less appro-
priate in a developing country situation. Trading
requires financial infrastructure and capacitated
market players (Lees, 2007). However, the financial
benefits of a WCS may still be available to partici-
pants without a full trading mechanism. South
Africa’s financial sector is well advanced, and this
may mitigate this concern.
The use of deemed savings calculation methods
may reduce the administrative strain of a WCS,
although this may still require capacity to develop.
Accurate and timely monitoring and compliance
evaluation is crucial to the performance of a market
mechanism for greenhouse gas mitigation (Dunn et
al., 2008). South Africa’s experience in DSM pro-
vides it with some capacity in this regard. Technical
knowledge, administrative capacity, and monitoring
and verification challenges are not held to be insur-
mountable though (Lees, 2007). 
Where the ECS has a very strong advantage as
a greenhouse gas mitigation policy instrument is
related to timing and political support. Its develop-
ment has been prioritised due to the energy crisis,
and it presents an already existing instrument tar-
geting the technologies identified in the LTMS
under the ‘Start now’ strategic option (Dunn et al.,
2008). The ECS could therefore potentially be con-
sidered as a central component of a suite of green-
house gas mitigation policy instruments. There may
be the opportunity to expand the ECS in the medi-
um term to include absolute emission reductions, or
to provide baseline-and-credit projects into a cap-
and-trade emissions trading scheme. The point of
regulation of the ECS (large energy consumers)
presents one of the most appropriate points of reg-
ulation for an emissions trading scheme (Dunn et
al., 2008), and it is not clear whether South Africa
has the capacity to administer more than one such
scheme given capacity constraints and the size of its
economy. However, whether the ECS could play a
central role in the country’s suite of greenhouse gas
mitigation policy instruments will depend on its per-
formance and flexibility of design, and the extent to
which its current proponents are open to the possi-
bility of alignment. 
Finally, from a fiscal budgetary perspective, a
WCS has a low cost to government, important in a
country such as South Africa where there are many
competing, and perhaps higher priority demands
on government expenditure than greenhouse gas
mitigation. 
2.3.2 Areas for further research
There is limited experience and therefore analy-
sis on WCS available to date, and even less on the
potential interaction and linkages of WCS and
emissions trading schemes and the appropriateness
and role of WCS as greenhouse gas mitigation pol-
icy instruments. The following areas for further
research are highlighted as being particularly rele-
vant to the objectives of this paper, and the South
African greenhouse gas policy context:
• What is the role of a WCS as a greenhouse gas
mitigation policy instrument in a developing
country?
• How could the ECS contribute towards South
Africa’s greenhouse gas mitigation trajectory
and policy framework to achieve its reduction
targets? Does the New South Wales GGAS
scheme offer any insights into the combination
of baseline-and-credit energy efficiency and
both emissions trading and green certificate
schemes?
• Is a white certificate scheme more efficient in
eliciting energy efficiency activities because it is
focused solely on this objective, or would an
emissions trading scheme encompassing emis-
sion reduction opportunities from a number of
activities result in greater diversity of costs of
reduction opportunities, and therefore cost effi-
ciency?
• How can it be ensured that the energy efficien-
cies achieved through the ECS are long-term
and sustainable in nature?
• How can the RTC trading elements of the ECS
24 Journal of Energy in Southern Africa  •  Vol 22 No 1  •  February 2011
be designed to potentially allow for the inclusion
of additional greenhouse gas mitigation sources
in the future? Is this desirable?
• What are the lessons from other countries’ expe-
rience regarding the integration of WCS into
greenhouse gas policy frameworks (with a focus
on the UK and Australian experience)?
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